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Law and economics-the systematic application of neoclassical
price theory to legal problems 1-has dominated the legal academy
in recent years. One recent study found that law and economics
"for several decades appears to have pervaded about one quarter
of scholarship in elite law reviews,"2 and that figure may seriously
t Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980,
Claremont Men's College; J.D. 1983, Yale Law School. I am deeply indebted to David
D. Friedman, who patiently corrected many errors and tried to warn me of others. Any
errors that remain are attributable solely to my stubbornness. I have also benefitted from
comments by Anthony D'Amato, John J. Donohue III, Mark F. Grady, David Haddock,
Herbert Hovenkamp, Keith N. Hylton, James Lindgren, Thomas W. Merrill, Geoffrey P.
Miller, Michael B. Rappaport, Murray N. Rothbard, John Earle Strong, and Martin
Zelder.
1. More precisely, law and economics is the systematic application of theories of
rational choice to legal problems, though neoclassical economics is by far the most popu-
lar rational choice model. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 15-52 (1988) (describing the role of neoclassical price theory in law and econom-
ics); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-10 (3d ed. 1986) (same). In
its broadest, least contentious form, rational choice theory simply posits that people use
the scarce means at their disposal, including their ability to discover, create, or imagine
new resources and opportunities, to maximize their attainment of desired ends. Beyond
that point, the theory of rational choice fractures along several lines. One disagreement
concerns the epistemological status of the basic rational choice thesis: Is it an axiom
implicit in the concept of human action, a testable empirical hypothesis, or an instrumen-
tal assumption selected for its ability to generate useful predictions? A second, and close-
ly related, disagreement concerns the meaning of rationality in the theory of rational
choice: Does ratiofiality in this context mean only purposefulness or does it also assume
or hypothesize some degree of consistency, clarity, efficacy, etc.? A third related disagree-
ment concerns the scope and qualitative character of the conclusions that one can derive
from rational choice theory. My Article is concerned principally with this last category of
disagreements; I aim to clarify the permissible scope and character of arguments that
employ the concept of "social efficiency."
2. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture" and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 23, 28 (1989). Professor
Ellickson surveyed annual volumes of the Harvard Law Review, the Stanford Law Re-
view, the University of Chicago Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal at five-year inter-
vals, ending with 1985-1986.
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understate the theory's influence.3 A number of justifiably well-
regarded scholarly journals devote themselves almost exclusively to
economic analysis of law, and the subject is now a regular part of
law school curricula.' Perhaps most importantly, law and econom-
ics is a pervasive and influential presence in informal academic
discussions. Even legal scholars who profess no significant interest
in law and economics can and do talk with facility, if not always
with perfect understanding, about such law and economics staples
as marginal cost curves, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and the Coase
Theorem.' Interest in law and economics may have levelled off in
the past few years,7 but advocates of an economic approach to
legal analysis cannot be displeased with their progress.'
Despite law and economics' undeniable success, however,
some very basic methodological issues remain strangely underde-
veloped. Serious threshold questions about the meaning and coher-
ence of some of law and economics' central concepts must be
answered before one can properly assess either positive or norma-
tive applications of the theory.9 In particular, it is common knowl-
3. The study counted only articles that were "friendly to the economic paradigm
and also made use of, or cited many works in, economics or law and economics." Id. at
27. A more accurate test of influence would not only survey a broader range of journals,
see iL at 28 n.15, but would also consider the extent to which advocates of noneconomic
approaches to legal scholarship deem it necessary to take account of or criticize law and
economics.
4. I have in mind the Journal of Law and Economics, the Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organization, and the Journal of Legal Studies.
5. The 1991-1992 AALS Directory of Law Teachers lists 111 law professors at 85
schools who formally teach a course in law and economics. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, 1991-92 AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1078-79 (1991). There is
no way to estimate the extent to which law and economics permeates the teaching of
substantive courses.
6. See JULEs L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 67 (1988).
7. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 26 ("[L]aw and economics is no longer growing
as a scholarly or curricular force within the leading American law schools.").
8. For an upbeat report on the status of law and economics from its best-known
booster, see Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 927,
928-29 (1988).
9. The positive and normative projects of law and economics are distinct enterprises
that must be analyzed and evaluated separately. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 20-21. In
its positive guise, law and economics purports to predict legal events, such as the general
trend of outcomes of common law adjudications, or to describe the consequences of legal
rules, such as minimum wage laws or a negligence standard for tort liability. In its nor-
mative guise, law and economics, as does any other normative legal theory, purports to
guide the decisionmaking of judges, legislators, and other legal actors. One can embrace
some or all of the positive project(s) of law and economics while rejecting its normative
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edge among law and economics scholars that the oft-employed
concept of "social efficiency" is a highly equivocal term; this Arti-
cle examines six different meanings of the concept, and I make no
claim to completeness. Yet much of the law and economics schol-
arship, most of the critical literature," and virtually all casual
conversation concerning law and economics either employs the
concept of social efficiency without defining it or defines it in a
way that plainly renders it incoherent or empty.11 The most so-
phisticated law and economics scholars, exemplified by Judge
Richard Posner,12 do in fact employ a coherent and robust con-
component, and vice versa.
10. Criticism of law and economics has become a cottage industry. For a small but
representative sampling of criticism of various law and economics theses that spans the
jurisprudential and ideological spectrums, see COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 95-132; MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 126-85 (1987); Guido Calabresi, The
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony
D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 513, 514-19 (1989); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
2-5 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL L. REV. 815
(1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 227 (1979); Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith,
Richard Posner, and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209
(1988); Joseph M. Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TORONTO
L.J. 227, 234-39 (1976).
11. "Incoherent" and "empty" are terms often used but seldom defined. The literal
meaning of "coherence" is "the quality or state of holding together." See WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 440 (1986). A theory or concept can be inco-
herent--can fail to hold together-because it is contradictory or unintelligible, embodies a
category mistake, see infra note 30, or is so unconnected to reality as to fall outside the
bounds of rational discourse. By "empty" I mean "having no actual referent in the real
world." "Leprechauns," for example, is an empty concept, though "mental images of
leprechauns" is not empty. There is of course a necessary temporal dimension to empti-
ness (no referent now? no referent -ever?), but to take account of this dimension here, or
to explain how to identify the referents of relational concepts like "wide" or "the,"
would add complexity without advancing understanding.
12. This use of Judge Posner as an exemplar should not obscure the pioneering
contributions of such giants as Gary Becker, Guido Calabresi, Ronald Coase, Harold
Demsetz, William Landes, and Henry Manne. Nor should one ignore the dozens of con-
temporaries of Judge Posner, many of whom sharply disagree with him on questions of
policy and method and have helped mold the present shape of law and economics. But it
is surely no accident that Judge Posner's professional career neatly tracks law and
economics' rise to glory. Both alone and in his numerous collaborations with Professor
Landes, Judge Posner gave definition to the positive project of law and economics. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972); WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). In
addition, he almost singehandedly constructed a systematic defense of wealth maximiza-
tion as a moral guide. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUsTICE 48-115
(1981) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE]; Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maxi-
19921
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ception of social efficiency, but at the cost of cutting the term
"efficiency" loose from its ordinary-language moorings and thereby
raising a serious danger of equivocation.
This Article explores the implications of methodological indi-
vidualism for economic arguments that employ the concept of
"efficiency" in a social context.3 In Part I, I describe the princi-
ples of methodological individualism that ought to guide sound
economic analysis. In particular, I set out at some length the
meaning and implications of economic subjectivism, including the
critical implication that interpersonal comparisons of utility or
satisfaction are, if given a straightforward interpretation, meaning-
less. The impossibility of such comparisons is almost an article of
faith among modem economists. I argue that the economists are
correct in an important sense, but that the problem of interperson-
al comparisons is far more complex and subtle than is often recog-
nized. Specifically, I describe the different contexts in which the
subjectivist position is correct and incorrect, and I explain how the
position can be reconciled with our obvious ability in everyday life
to make useful and intelligible comparisons of satisfaction across
persons.
In the abstract, the principles of methodological individualism
are widely accepted by law and economics scholars. In practice,
they are frequently honored in the breach. Thus, in Part II, I use
these principles to analyze the concepts of economic efficiency that
form the bedrock of virtually all normative, and much descriptive,
economic analysis of law. I demonstrate that many of those con-
cepts are either unintelligible or empty and thus cannot serve as
premises in sound normative arguments or descriptive state-
mization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985); see also Lloyd
Cohen, A Justification of Social Wealth Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical Theory,
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (1987) (analyzing Judge Posner's theory about the
correspondence between moral intuition and wealth maximization).
13. I do not explore the implications of ethical individualism for law and economics.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text. It is worth noting, however, that Judge Posner
has recently acknowledged that a moral theory grounded in economic efficiency-or, as
he terms it, social wealth maximization, see infra notes 107-08 and accompanying
text-gives insufficient weight to established ethical traditions of individualism. The ethic
of wealth maximization "treats people as if they were cells of a single organism," which
"implies that if the prosperity of the society can be promoted by enslaving its least pro-
ductive citizens, the sacrifice of their freedom is worthwhile." According to Judge Posner,
such an implication is "contrary to the unshakable moral intuitions of Americans." RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1990).
[Vol. 42:53, 56
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ments1 -- unless one holds, as I believe Judge Posner does, a very
thin conception of the purposes and possibilities of moral dis-
course. I then argue that the one concept of efficiency that is both
coherent and robust in a social setting-the concept of wealth
maximization-is far enough removed from ordinary understand-
ings of efficiency to give rise to the very real possibility of equivo-
cation." Briefly stated, to the extent that the term "efficiency"
refers to human satisfaction, it is incoherent or empty whenever a
large number of people are involved; to the extent that "efficien-
cy" does not refer to human satisfaction, that fact should be made
clear, and arguments or descriptions using the term must be care-
fully scrutinized with that limitation kept in mind.
In the course of Part II's discussion, I also identify the overt-
ly anti-individualistic moral assumptions that are implicit in the
most commonly used normative theories of economic efficiency.
Because an adequate normative critique of law and economics (or
of any other approach to law) would require presentation and
validation of an objectively true moral theory," I do not draw
from this identification any conclusions regarding the merits of law
and economics; nevertheless, this identification deserves recogni-
14. The argument is different from the more common complaint that economic mod-
els are unrealistic. That is in fact no complaint at all. Every model is unrealistic by defi-
nition; the only serious question is whether the model's omissions from (or additions to)
reality are important enough to vitiate its usefulness. See POSNER, supra note 13, at
365-67; POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-17. My complaint is that certain concepts of effi-
ciency are either unintelligible or entirely useless for prescriptive and (certain) descriptive
purposes. None of this is necessarily a problem for persons who are interested only in
making predictions, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text, so at least part of the
positive project of law and economics has nothing to fear. Those who would base pre-
scriptions or descriptions on premises that are known to be incoherent or empty, howev-
er, need very good reasons for doing so.
15. Herbert Hovenkamp has cogently raised similar concerns about the use of the
term "welfare" by law and economics scholars. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 68-69 (1990) (pointing out the
difference between the meanings of "welfare" held by economists and by ordinary peo-
ple).
16. Although I have previously defended a less onerous standard for evaluating
normative discourse in legi1 scholarship, see Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727, 775-83 (1988), I was wrong. If one cannot provide a
rational grounding for one's normative claims, it is hard to see what intellectual purpose
they serve. There is at least one quasi-normative activity, however, that can profitably be
pursued without getting hopelessly mired in metaethics: One can discuss the implications
of a given normative theory in "if . . . then" form. This is in fact a form of positive,
descriptive analysis, which can be of considerable interest or value; but it does not consti-
tute serious normative analysis unless the underlying theory can be validated.
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tion. Part III contains brief concluding remarks about the future
course of law and economics scholarship.
I come neither to bury law and economics nor to praise it;
this Article is less a critique of law and economics than a clarifica-
tion of its appropriate scope. Furthermore, much of what goes
under the name of law and economics need not, and does not,
employ the concept of social efficiency at all. Indeed, there are
some contexts in which law and economics entails nothing more
than thinking clearly and carefully about the consequences of
actions, including unintended or nonobvious consequences-a
mission that is not only coherent and robust, but is a welcome
contrast to the fuzzy-headed moralizing that so often passes for
legal scholarship. My complaint is with careless or equivocal treat-
ments of the concept of "efficiency," not with economic analysis of
law in all of its varied manifestations.
I am hardly the first person to seek to clarify the meaning of
"efficiency" in law and economics; many of the arguments I
advance are familiar, and even old hat, to law and economics
scholars. But even the best analyses of law and economics tend to
take methodological principles for granted, without serious philo-
sophical scrutiny; to concentrate too heavily on the particular
theories of Judge Posner rather than on the less sophisticated but
more pernicious theories that sub silentio influence academic dis-
cussions; and, most significantly, to shrink from the full conse-
quences of a consistent methodological individualism. My primary
contribution to the law and economics debate is thus focus and
consistency--or, as Judge Posner might term it, fanaticism. 8
I. A BRIEF ESSAY ON ECONOMIC METHOD
Individualism can describe either a moral posture, a positive
methodological approach, or both. In this Article, I use the term
principally in the methodological sense, which holds that the indi-
vidual is the irreducible unit of positive economic analysis.'That
17. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 347-56 (1986) (distinguishing different
conceptions of efficiency); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4-16 (1982) (same).
18. Cf. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 97 (arguing that "only a
fanatic" would require unanimity to legitimate a social institution); Posner, supra note 12,
at 100 (describing adherence to a strict unanimity requirement as "fanaticism").
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principle and certain of its most important implications require
careful examination.
A. The Primacy of Methodological Individualism
Human actions are always the actions of concrete individuals.
Perhaps those actions are always influenced, or even conditioned,
by the individual's location in a particular social group, and thus
the study of human behavior in anything other than a social set-
ting may be wholly uninteresting and unfruitful. It is nonetheless
true that when one studies human behavior, one always studies
the behavior of individual humans. There is simply nothing else to
study: "[T]here are no such things as ends of or actions by
'groups,' 'collectives,' or 'States,' which do not take place as ac-
tions by various specific individuals."19 When we speak of the
action of a group, as we often do, we speak metaphorically. Na-
tions do not in fact wage war, mobs do not riot, and gangs do not
rape. Individuals do.
Methodological individualism ° means nothing more than it
says. It most emphatically is not a metaphysical claim about hu-
man autonomy, a psychological claim about the formation of pref-
erences, or a normative celebration of separateness. 1 It is simply
a positive statement about the appropriate, indeed the only possi-
ble, objects of social scientific study. It does not question the
importance of social entities like nations, classes, and ideological
groups. Indeed, "[m]ethodological individualism, far from contest-
ing the significance of such collective wholes, considers it as one
of its main tasks to describe and to analyze their becoming and
their disappearing, their changing structures, and their opera-
19. 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECO-
NOMIC PRINCIPLES 2 (1962); see also LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE
ON ECONOMIES 42 (3d rev. ed., Henry Regnery Co. 1966) (1949) ("A collective operates
always through the intermediary of one or several individuals whose actions are related
to the collective as the secondary source.").
20. For additional descriptions of methodological individualism, see VON MISES, supra
note 19, at 41-43, 143; LUDWIG VON MISES, TBE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 80-82 (1962); Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of
Economics, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 523 (1986).
21. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 993, 1049-51 (1990) (describing Progressive-Era criticisms of neoclassical econom-
ics for treating preferences in isolation from their social context).
1992]
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tion."' Methodological individualism is simply recognition of the
fact that because the behavior of institutions is really the behavior
of individuals in particular institutional settings, "[tihe only way to
a cognition of collectives is the analysis of the conduct of its mem-
bers."
B. The Primacy of Subjectivism
Human action consists in individuals choosing, at each dis-
crete instant in time, one of the myriad possibilities open to them.
The rationality postulate of economics states (or assumes, or pre-
dicts) that each action of each individual will aim at achieving a
more preferred state of affairs than the individual believes would
result from other courses of action. Even a decision to take no
overt action is an economic decision: The state of rest, with all of
its consequences, is preferred to its available alternatives. 4
Action thus always demonstrates a preference on the part of
the actor.' We know that at the instant in time at which an ac-
tion is taken, the chosen course is the actor's preferred course:
The actor expects to gain utility from substituting a more desired
state of affairs for a less desired one. (That expectation, of course,
may be disappointed if the actor's beliefs about the various possi-
ble states of affairs turn out to be mistaken.) But can we-or the
actor-say anything useful about the level of utility that results
from action? In particular, can we make judgments that compare
22. VON MISES, supra note 19, at 42.
23. VON MISES, supra note 20, at 81.
24. An alternative is "available" to a particular actor only if that actor is aware of
it. At the relevant moment of action, lack of information is as much an obstacle to avail-
ability as the laws of physics. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1218-19.
25. In the absence of observable action, the nature, and even the bare existence, of
preferences must be inferred. Such an inference, however, will often be well justified by
the evidence, which notably includes our introspective knowledge of human behavior.
Accordingly, I do not adhere to a strict requirement of "demonstrated preference," in
which preferences are deemed cognizable only if logically entailed by an act of choice.
Reliance on this kind of interpretive knowledge of human behavior, however, requires
one to go beyond what many economists might regard as the proper domain of economic
science. Cf Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 89, 98-100 (Edwin G. Dolan ed.,
1976) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS] (insisting that self-described scientific economists must
adopt a strong theory of demonstrated preference, even when they know "from interpre-
tive understanding of ... hearts and minds" that people sometimes have preferences that
are not demonstrated by action).
[Vol. 42:53
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the utility that A obtains from X with the utility that B obtains
from X or Y?
The near-uniform answer of modern economists and legal
scholars is "no," which they express by saying that it is impossible
to make interpersonal comparisons of utility." The standard argu-
ment for this proposition is seemingly straightforward. When we
talk about a person's height or weight, we can do so in terms of
interpersonally observable units of measurement such as feet or
pounds. These units provide common* numerical standards that we
can use to compare the properties of various objects or to track
changes in our own height or weight over time. But there is no
such unit of measurement for utility that enables us to say that
someone (including ourselves) derived N amount of utility from an
action. Accordingly, there is no common scale, external to A and
26. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 59 (1976)
("Economists today generally believe that summation of the utilities of different people is
meaningless .. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 79 ("The 'in-
terpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modem economist, and rightly so,
because there is no metric for making such a comparison."); Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v.
Commissioner. Musings About Debt Cancellations and "Consumption" in an Income Tax
Base, 45 TAX L. REV. 677, 688 (1990) ("[I]nterpersonal comparisons of subjective utility
are not possible."); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL L. REV. 1, 48 n.140
(1989) ("Of course, interpersonal comparisons of utility are generally impossible ..... );
Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 859 (1988) ("Most commentators, especially economists, argue that
one cannot make . . . interpersonal utility comparisons."); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 n.28 (1986) (noting "the impossibility of making interper-
sonal comparisons of utility"); Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
999, 1005 (1987) (noting the consensus against interpersonal utility comparisons); Luize E.
Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 504
n.169 (1991) ("[I]t is impossible to measure an individual's utility, to make interpersonal
comparisons of utility, or to aggregate utility."). For an excellent critical history of the
emergence of this consensus among modem economists, see Hovenkamp, supra note 21,
at 1033-51.
Not all economists subscribe to the conventional wisdom. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN,
Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 264
(1982); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 319-21 (1955). Among legal scholars, dissenters
include persons as diverse as Richard Epstein and Robin West. See Richard A. Epstein,
Rights and Rights Talk, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1118 (1992) (reviewing MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991));
Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 683-85 (1990); see
also David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpreta-
tion, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1843 (1991) (describing the refusal to acknowledge the
legitimacy of interpersonal utility comparisons as a "taboo").
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B, on which A's and B's utilities can be placed, and the utility A
obtains from choosing or experiencing X and the utility B obtains
from choosing or experiencing X or Y thus cannot scientifically be
added, subtracted, compared, or contrasted.
This argument's conclusion is fundamentally correct: Interper-
sonal comparisons of utility of the form described above are in-
deed rationally inadmissible. But the road to that conclusion is not
as smooth as this argument suggests: The argument's premises are
not self-evident, and the conclusion itself is ambiguous.
Economists who deny that utility is interpersonally compara-
ble can mean either of two very different things. First, they might
simply doubt our present measurement abilities. One such argu-
ment might assume that there is some correlation between, for
example, utility and observable brain states, such that a sufficiently
sensitive "brain-o-meter" could detect these physiological responses
and thereby provide a scale of measurement, but maintain that we
do not presently know what to measure or how to take such mea-
surements.' This argument might conclude that at a minimum it
is incumbent upon anyone who wants to make objective state-
ments about utility to specify the scale of measurement involved
and the method by which measurements are taken.
This argument is not, by itself, decisive against the permissi-
bility of interpersonal utility comparisons.' Measurement 'prob-
lems can only be deemed insuperable if we independently know
that interpersonal utility judgments are impossible or meaningless.
If interpersonal judgments are possible in principle, we have good
reason to believe that many of our present judgments are correct,
at least in extreme cases (involving, for example, A's avoiding
death by torture versus B's avoiding a hangnail). Our widespread
agreement about relative intensities of preference in such extreme
cases is at least as impressive as our widespread agreement about,
for example, the relative lengths of temporal intervals in the ab-
sence of precise measuring devices. The fact that we can disagree
about the extent of temporal intervals in closer cases does not
mean that there is no "real" phenomenon to be objectively, inter-
personally measured.29
27. See, e.g., Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Col-
lective Choice, 56 S. CAL L. REV. 461, 516-17 (1983).
28. I am indebted to David Friedman for persuading me in conversation of this
point.
29. Cf. Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the
[Vol. 42:53
EFFICIENCY AND INDIVIDUALISM
Thus, if there is a fundamental problem with interpersonal
utility comparisons, it must stem from a second, and stronger,
argument that denies that interpersonal comparison of utility is
even a meaningful concept. According to this position, it is not
false or unknowable to say that A's utility is "greater than," "less
than," or "equal to" B's utility; rather, it is a category mistake: the
application of a predicate to a subject in a manner that is mean-
ingless or absurd.' This view maintains that talking about inter-
personal comparisons of utility simply does not make sense, just as
it does not make sense to talk about a happy rock or a greenish
shade of cold. Thus, it is not a question of waiting for someone to
invent the right tools and units of measurement and comparison;
but rather, the measuring and comparing enterprise is ill-conceived
from the outset.
Anyone who seeks to explain and defend this latter position,
as I do here, must deal with the obvious fact that we can and do
make interpersonal comparisons of various sorts all the time, and
with no apparent sense of anomaly. As many scholars have ob-
served, statements such as "it means more to you than it does to
me" are common expressions that we all understand.3 Surely
everyone would agree, for example, that long-suffering victims of
communism have received greater utility than I from recent events
in Eastern Europe. It seems just silly to doubt that their utility is
"greater" than mine, that the utility a starving person would re-
Measurability of Utility, 60 J. POL. ECON. 463, 471-74 (1952) (similarly arguing that utility
is just as "measurable" as length and temperature).
30. See generally A.C. Baier, Nonsense, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
520, 520-21 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (discussing category mistakes). For example, the
statement "all rocks are chartreuse" is false, but it is not absurd; all rocks at least pos-
sess the property of color, even if they do not all exhibit that particular color. In the
case of a statement like "all rocks are happy," however, declaring it false seems inade-
quate ("if all rocks aren't happy, which ones are sad or nonchalant?"). Emotional states
simply are not the sorts of predicates that can be applied to rocks.
31. See, e.g., K.J. Arrow, Values and Collective Decision-Making, in ECONOMIC JUS-
TlCE 117, 135 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1973); Donald Davidson, Judging Interpersonal
Interests, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 195, 195 (Jon Elster & Aanund
Hylland eds., 1986); Epstein, supra note 26, at 1118; Kent Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit,
and Need. Ties that Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727, 751-52 (1984); James
Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 45,
65 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPERSONAL COMPARI-
SONS]; Harsanyi, supra note 26, at 316-17; Aanund Hylland, Subjective Interpersonal Com-




ceive from finally getting a decent meal is "greater" than the
utility I would receive from having steak tonight rather than fettu-
cine, or that the-utility of the average person in the United States
is "greater" than that of the average person in Cuba.
Statements of this kind are in fact meaningful and informa-
tive. There may, however, be either more or less to their meaning
than meets the eye, and we must accordingly think very carefully
about what we can plausibly say about "utility" and how we must
say it. As is true of "efficiency," "utility" is a highly equivocal
term. 2 Before one can decide whether, and under 1hat circum-
stances, interpersonal utility comparisons are possible or meaning-
ful, one must first specify what is meant by "utility." The
meaningfulness of measurements and comparisons of utility de-
pends heavily on what is being measured and compared.3 In par-
ticular, one must distinguish carefully between conceptions of
utility that refer to welfare and conceptions that refer to satisfac-
tion.
If utility means welfare, the inquiry shifts to the appropriate
meaning of welfare. There are innumerable meanings of welfare
(and hence of utility defined as welfare) that render interpersonal
comparisons, of either a normative or positive variety, entirely
unproblematic from a methodological perspective.
Almost no one denies that a normative interpersonal welfare
comparison between A and B can be meaningful, as long as the
underlying conception of welfare is meaningful.' If some moral
theory ranks A's having X over B's having X or Y, one can freely
say that the first outcome enhances social welfare more, and hence
generates more utility, than does the second-provided only that
32. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 40 n.13 (1987) ("Utilities can,
of course, be defined in many different ways .... "); Griffin, supra note 31, at 48
(" 'Utility' is a technical term and so needs stipulation (but seldom gets much)."); Daniel
Kahneman & Carol Varey, Notes on the Psychology of Utility, in INTERPERSONAL COM-
PARISONS, supra note 31, at 127, 127-29 (discussing different conceptions of utility).
33. Cf. Griffin, supra note 31, at 52 ("Just how big a problem interpersonal com-
parisons of utility present varies with the conception of utility in use. With some concep-
tions the problem is slight; with others it is great.").
34. Indeed, the most famous modem objection to interpersonal utility compari-
sons-that of Lionel Robbins, see infra note 83 and accompanying text-argued precisely
that such comparisons were normative, and hence outside the boundaries of scientific
economics. See SEN, supra note 26, at 265. Persons who doubt the meaningfulness or
coherence of all normative discourse will of course object to such normative welfare
comparisons, but that objection does not concern me here.
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the operative moral theory is coherent. But if economists or legal
scholars want to use the term "utility" in this fashion (which es-
sentially treats "welfare" or "utility" simply as a label to describe
the conclusions of normative theorizing), it is incumbent upon
them to specify the relevant moral theory and, if they mean to do
more than merely describe its operation in hypothetical form, 'to
give the theory a rational grounding. 5
Positive interpersonal welfare comparisons between A and B
can also be meaningful if the underlying conception of welfare is
coherent. For example, one can make good judgments about the
relative effects of some action on the welfare, and hence utility, of
A and B, if one measures welfare by expected lifespan. Similarly,
one can define welfare, and hence utility, ini terms of money in-
come, caloric intake, frequency of smiles or frowns, or some index
of such factors. All such definitions allow interpersonal compari-
sons to be made with varying degrees of precision. 6 Any scholar
who uses "utility" to refer to such a conception of welfare need
only specify that conception and assure that it is coherent.
Although I cannot prove it, I do not believe that any such
welfare-based usages of "utility" are standard among law and
economics scholars (though the same may or may not be true of
economists as a whole). The focus of law and economics seems to
be the satisfaction of preferences rather than objectified measures
of welfare or well-being. 7 When law and economics scholars
speak of a person's utility, they appear to mean, in one form or
another, the person's satisfaction or happiness." To understand
35. Economists and legal scholars engaged in positive theorizing will by definition es-
chew this approach. Scholars pursuing normative utility theory in this fashion may or may
not face problems of coherence (depending upon their chosen normative theories), but
they will certainly have a difficult time explaining why anyone should pay attention to
them. If I may be permitted the indulgence of self-quotation: "It is conceivable that the
ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical problems of the ages will be solved by an
article in a twentieth-century, English-language law journal. But I rather doubt it."
Lawson, supra note 16, at 778.
36. The degree of precision affects the usefulness of a conception of welfare, but
not its coherence. It may be possible, under some conceptions of welfare, to make gross
comparative judgments among persons without being able to resolve all hard cases. See
AMARTYA SEN, Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability,. in CHOICE, WEL-
FARE AND MEASUREMENT, supra note 26, at 203, 205-06.
37. For an illuminating discussion of the uneasy relationship between welfare and
preference satisfaction, see generally Allan Gibbard, Interpersonal Comparisons: Prefer-
ence, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY, supra note 31, at 165.
38. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 58 ("The idea of utility grows out of the
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the meaning 'of utility, then, one must first understand the mean-
ing of satisfaction.
If satisfaction is defined in the same way as welfare, perhaps
by reference to objective physical manifestations like facial ges-
tures,39 no .problems of coherence are raised: It is certainly possi-
ble to compare in any number of ways A's facial gestures (or
other behaviors) to B's. But I doubt whether that objective con-
ception of satisfaction is what most law and economics scholars, or
most people, have in mind when they talk about utility-as-satisfac-
tion. The more prevalent notion of satisfaction undoubtedly refers
to some internal psychic event or feeling; in ordinary discourse,
satisfaction or utility is a state of mind.' The relevant psychic
feeling can be characterized in many different ways: hedonic plea-
sure,41 pleasure of a certain quality,42 or eudaimonia;43 one can
meaningfully define utility in any of these terms.44
Once utility is understood to mean satisfaction in some such
experiential sense,45 the problem of interpersonal comparability
rears its head. Satisfaction just is, metaphysically, something that is
attempt to understand all of an individual's choices in terms of a single thing he is trying
to maximize-happiness, pleasure, or something similar. We call this his utility."). I am
willing to be told that I have totally misunderstood the sense in which law and econom-
ics scholars use the concept of utility. Indeed, my principal purpose here is to "smoke
out" the meanings that law and economics scholars attribute to their central concepts.
39. See generally SEN, supra note 26, at 265-67 (describing such "behaviourist" ap-
proaches).
40. One can also use "satisfaction" to describe the realization of preferences rather
than the mental state that results from their realization. See SEN, supra note 32, at
45-46; Gibbard, supra note 37, at 168-69; Kahneman & Varey, supra note 32, at 128;
Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS, supra note 31, at 17, 24. But utility seems to describe more the conse-
quences of preference satisfaction than the bare act of preference satisfaction. Further-
more, unless one simply counts all preferences equally, there must be some basis for
distinguishing the realization of different preferences, and it is hard to see what that
basis would be if not the psychic effects on the actor.
41. See Kahneman & Varey, supra note 32, at 127-28.
42. See JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 9-14 (E.P. Dutton 1951) (1863).
43. Eudaimonia is "the condition of living in harmony with one's daimon or innate
potentiality, 'living in truth to oneself.' It is marked by a distinctive feeling that consti-
tutes its intrinsic reward and therefore bears the same name as the condition itself."
DAVID L. NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM
216 (1976).
44. Perhaps, as Mill claimed, it is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied," but the fool's state of mind is nonetheless real. MiLL, supra note 42, at 12.
45. I have borrowed the term "experiential" from Professor Scanlon. See Scanlon,
supra note 40, at 20.
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unique to an experiencing, acting individual. We can all experience
satisfaction, but we cannot experience each other's satisfaction.
Even if satisfaction were somehow correlated with physical brain
states, we could not "measure" satisfaction by measuring the brain
states. Satisfaction is an experiential state, not the physiological
manifestation of that experiential state. One can no more measure
satisfaction by reference to physiological phenomena than one can
measure it by reference to money.
Experientialists, of course, must account for our evident abili-
ty to make interpersonal judgments of the form, "it means more
to you than it does to me,"46 which seems plainly to contemplate
interpersonal comparisons of the intensity of psychic states. The
standard answer, which I endorse, relies upon what Kenneth Ar-
row has called extended sympathy,' which "reduce[s] interperson-
al comparisons to less problematic intrapersonal ones, by appeal to
a judge's own preference as to possible states of himself."48 We
all seem able to make personal judgments about the intensity of
our own satisfaction, to the effect that we prefer W to X "more"
than we prefer Y to Z. This implies that we all have an internal
"psychic scale" by which we can in some sense measure our own
satisfaction, at least in terms of "greater" or "lesser" intensity.49
Furthermore, we have imagination and memory. Therefore, a
subjectivist would .interpret a judgment that, for example, a starv-
ing person's meal generates more satisfaction than our own con-
sumption of a favorite main course to mean that the satisfaction
that each of us believes we would experience when in the position
of the starving person would rank higher on our internal
scales-be more intense than-the satisfaction from presently
choosing a marginally superior dinner.. It is a judgment, or rather
46. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
47. Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 67
AM. ECON. REV. 219 (1977).
48. Griffin, supra note 31, at 52. For an illuminating discussion of how this proce-
dure can be applied to a wide range of judgments, see R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING:
ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 117-29 (1981).
49. It does not matter for the present argument whether these personal judgments
are cardinal or ordinal. I do not have the background to understand the intricacies of
the von Neumann-Morgenstem Index, which purports to provide a cardinal measurement
for personal utility, but it is evidently well accepted that von Neumann-Morgenstem mea-
surements do not provide a basis for interpersonal comparisons. See P.K. Pattanaik, Risk;
Impersonality and the Social Welfare Function, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE, supra note 31, at
298, 316; Letter from David D. Friedman to Gary Lawson (May 29, 1992).
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a guess or prediction, about our own experiences, and thus re-
quires no direct comparison of our satisfaction with anyone else's.
Of course, if virtually every person we know would make the
same judgment, that tells us something interesting and useful
about human satisfaction-namely, that other people's experiential
capacities are in some respects similar to our own. But that struc-
tural similarity in capacities seems to be the only sense in which
satisfactions can be compared or contrasted across persons, and it
simply does not bridge the gap between my experience and yours.
I can imagine myself having different preferences than you do;
and to the extent that I can infer your preference-orderings from
your actions and words, perhaps I can even to some extent imag-
ine myself having "your" preferences (though the very act of
imagining them as my preferences transforms them). But the expe-
rience that I imagine from satisfying your-preferences-if-they-were-
mine is inescapably my own experience. Experience is metaphysi-
cally subjective, and thus incommensurable across persons." The
statement "It is more important to you that X than it is to me
that Y" is coherent only if it is translated to mean, "It would be
more important to me that X if I had a certain, different set of
preferences (which I believe that you have) than it is to me that
Y, given my existing preferences." If the statement is intended as
a direct comparison between my experience and yours, it is inco-
herent.
Although I suspect that most law and economics scholars
would agree with most of what I have said thus far about eco-
nomic methodology, the subjectivist position is not without critics.
Professor Hovenkamp, for example, protests that the subjectivist
criticism of interpersonal comparisons of utility51 proves too much:
If the subjective nature of our experience of satisfaction prevents
us from making interpersonal comparisons, it must also prevent us
from knowing that other people are conscious at all, as we have
no direct access to other minds but must infer their existence and
contents from external manifestations.5 2 But then if we are willing
50. Cf SEN, supra note 32, at 47 n.17 (doubting "the understandability and rele-
vance" of "hypothetical choices regarding becoming one person or another").
51. Professor Hovenkamp uses the term "well-being" to describe an experiential
conception of utility. See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 69 ("I therefore use the term
'well-being' to refer to some quantity, perhaps not even empirically measurable, related
to how happy or satisfied people feel.").
52. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1039-41; see also Gibbard, supra note 37, at
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to infer that other people experience the world in ways that we
can identify as "consciousness," why not also infer that we experi-
ence satisfaction on a common scale that at least permits us to
make interpersonal judgments of intensity in extreme cases in
terms of "greater" or "lesser" intensity?
The reason is that the evidence supports the first inference
but not the second. The inferential evidence for the existence of
other minds and for the structural similarity of human perceptions
is simply overwhelming. By the same, token, the evidence for other
people's ability to experience satisfaction and for structural similar-
ities in that faculty is also very powerful-by and large, we all
seem to rate the (imagined) satisfaction from eating after long
deprivation as more intense than the satisfaction from eating a
marginally better meal in our present circumstances. But none of
that provides a standard for comparison of satisfaction across
persons. It tells us that the structure of the human mind and hu-
man experience displays many similarities, but it remains to be
explained how that structural similarity can be translated into a
metric for interpersonal comparisons. Just as we can say that our
perceptions of reality are similar to those of other people, but
cannot say that they are identical, we can say that our experiences
of satisfaction are similar to those of other people, but cannot say
that they are identical. But an assumption of identity is necessary
to establish a common scale of measurement, even an ordinal one,
and hence to make interpersonal comparisons coherent.
So why not make that assumption? If one is willing to grant
that there are structural similarities in people's capacities to expe-
rience satisfaction, then why should one not also postulate the
possibility of a unitary interpersonal scale that at least permits
gross comparisons in extreme cases? Is there any more reason to
doubt the existence of such an underlying, albeit presently
unspecifiable, scale than to assume it?
Perhaps not. If satisfaction just is, metaphysically, the sort of
thing that cannot be compared across persons, as I maintain, then
I am correct to refrain from making that final assumption; on the
other hand, if it is not, then I am wrong. There is no obvious way
to choose between these hypotheses about the metaphysical nature
183 (agreeing that skepticism about interpersonal comparisons can lead to questions about
the very existence of others).
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of satisfaction. They are both consistent with all the evidence we
have, and they both generate rational world-views. How does one
pick sides?
The choice must ultimately rest on a basic epistemological
principle: The burden of proof lies with he who asserts the exis-
tence of an entity.53 An interpersonal utility scale is a metaphysi-
cal existent, and the burden of proof thus lies with the proponents
of such a scale. If the evidence is equally balanced between its
existence and nonexistence, one must opt for nonexistence, and
the nonexistence of such a scale destroys the meaningfulness of
direct interpersonal comparisons. I may be wrong to suppose that
the evidence is equally balanced,' but until convinced that it is
not, I must assume that interpersonal comparisons of utility
(where utility is understood as experiential satisfaction) are ratio-
nally inadmissible.
As I have suggested, and as we shall see in Part II, most of
the efforts of law and economics scholars to devise a useful con-
ception of "economic efficiency" are attempts to accommodate or
circumvent, rather than deny, the subjectivity of economic value.
The full consequences of economic subjectivism, however, have
been recognized only by a handful of economists associated with
the so-called Austrian school of economics;55 and then, even most
53. A full justification of this crucial principle would require a separate article,
which I hope someday to provide. The basic insight is that existence always has affirma-
tive consequences, while nonexistence does not. The best, or even the only possible,
evidence for the nonexistence of X is often (though not always) the absence of positive
evidence for the existence of X. Thus, the absence of evidence for X rationally supports
disbelief in its existence and warrants a general assignment of the burden of proof to
those who assert the existence of an entity. See generally LEONARD PEIKOFF,
OniEcrivisM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 167-68 (1991) (elaborating on the rule
that "the onus of proof is on him who asserts the positive"); Dale Lugenbehl, The Argu-
ment for an Objective Standard of Value, 55 PERSONALiST 155, 156-59 (1974) (outlining
the Objectivists' argument that the person claiming that something is possible bears the
burden of proving its existence).
54. David Friedman and Mike Rappaport have both suggested in conversation, for
example, that there are good evolutionary reasons to believe that interpersonal compari-
sons are possible, as the ability to make such comparisons would have positive survival
value. I have not given this argument the consideration that it deserves; if it is sound, it
might well change my view. My preliminary thoughts, however, are that our ability to
imagine ourselves having different preferences and the structural similarities in our capaci-
ties for satisfaction are enough to satisfy these evolutionary concerns, as they fully ac-
count for the useful interpersonal judgments that we make in everyday life.
55. The Austrian school of economics generally traces its origins to the work of
Carl Menger in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see LUDWIG M. LACHMANN,
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Austrians pull up short of the gate, notwithstanding the bold as-
sertion of Austrian giant Friedrich Hayek that "every important
advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a
further step in the consistent application of subjectivism."56 As
usual, Hayek was right. in particular, subjectivism has some oft-
overlooked consequences for the definition of an economic good
that must be kept in mind by law and economics scholars.
C. Subjectivism and Economic Goods
Every beginning economics student learns the law of dimin-
ishing marginal utility, which states that each additional, or margin-
al, unit of a good will be less highly valued by an actor than pre-
vious units.57 The law follows directly from the rationality postu-
The Significance of the Austrian School of Economics in the History of Ideas, in CAPITAL,
EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MARKET PROCESS 45, 45 (1977), though some essential con-
cepts were evident in Scholastic thinking as early as the 1500s, see Murray N. Rothbard,
New Light on the Prehistory of the Austrian School, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at
52, 54-58. Although "no two Austrians have ever completely agreed on methodology,"
STEPHEN C. LrnTLECHILD, THE FALLACY OF THE MIXED ECONOMY 16 (1979), few
would seriously quarrel with Israel Kirzner's summary description of Austrianism:
Austrian economists are subjectivists; they emphasize the purposefulness of hu-
man action; they are unhappy with constructions that emphasize equilibrium to
the exclusion of market processes; they are deeply suspicious of attempts to ap-
ply measurement procedures to economics; they are skeptical of empirical
"proofs" of economic theorems and consequently have serious reservations
about the validity and importance of a good deal of the empirical work being
carried on in the economics profession today.
Israel M. Kirzner, On the Method of Austrian Economics, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note
25, at 40, 40. The full flavor of Austrian methodology can be appreciated only by reading
the two principal treatises on Austrianism, see VON MISES, supra note 19; ROTHBARD,
supra note 19, but shorter and more serviceable methodological statements are available,
see LAWRENCE H. WHITE, METHODOLOGY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL (Center for Lib-
ertarian, Studies Occasional Paper Series No. 1, 1977); Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology:
The Methodology of Austrian Economics, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 19. For an
ingenious critique of Austrian methodology by a noted philosopher, and a response by a
noted Austrian, see Robert Nozick, On Austrian Methodology, 36 SYNTHESE 353 (1977);
Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology', 23 INQUIRY 397 (1980).
56. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE 51 (1952).
There is a rich and extensive Austrian literature on the nature and implications of
subjectivism. See id. at 41-60; VON MISES, supra note 19, at 97-98, 119-23; ROTHBARD,
supra note 19, at 256-66; Stephan Boehm, The Ambiguous Notion of Subjectivism: Com-
ment on Lachmann, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 41 (Israel M.
Kirzner ed., 1982); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Ludwig von Mises and the Extension of
Subjectivism, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra, at 31.
57. See generally HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 26, at 60-62; VON MISES, supra note 19,
at 119-25 (describing the manner in which man values things in society); ROTHBARD,
supra note 19, at 17-28.
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late of economics: Previous units of the good will presumably go
to satisfy the actor's most urgent wants, meaning that an addition-
al unit will have to satisfy relatively less urgent wants, and thus be
less highly valued." Few principles of economics are as simple or
important, and few have been as thoroughly misunderstood for so
long.
There are at least two critical limitations on application of
the law of diminishing marginal utility. First, and most obviously,
the law applies only to a single actor. For the reasons discussed in
the previous section, it does not permit utility comparisons across
persons. One cannot, for example, use the law of diminishing
marginal utility to argue that a rich man's millionth dollar is "less
highly valued" than a poor woman's first dollar, as that assumes a
common scale of satisfaction for the two people.59 I cannot con-
vey how many times I have heard the principle misused in this
fashion in casual conversations or classroom discussions, even by
people who would acknowledge their error in more careful mo-
ments.
Second, and more important for our purposes, the law of
diminishing marginal utility as a necessary economic truth holds
only for units of supply of the same good. The rationality postu-
late tells us that, at a given instant in time, an actor will put exist-
ing unit X to the highest-valued use that she believes can be
served by a unit of the good to which X belongs. We can logically
conclude that additional item Y will be put to a lower-valued use
than X only if Y is a unit of supply of the same good as X. If Y
is a unit of a different good, it is a contingent matter whether it
will serve a higher- or lower-valued end than X; one cannot in
that case employ the law of diminishing marginal utility to con-
clude necessarily that the end (and hence the means) will be low-
er-valued.
58. See ROTHBARD, supra note 19, at 20-23.
59. See id. at 260. The cited passage incidentally demonstrates the difficulty of main-
taining a consistent subjectivist posture. Professor Rothbard correctly observes that be-
cause the law of diminishing marginal utility applies only to individual persons, one can-
not claim "that an extra dollar is enjoyed less by a Rockefeller than by a poor man."
Id. He then adds as a reason for this conclusion, however, that "[ilt is certainly possible
that a Rockefeller enjoys the services of each dollar more than a poor, but highly ascet-
ic, individual does." Id. It is not possible; it is incoherent. It would be possible only if
utilities could be compared across persons, which Professor Rothbard adamantly maintains
is impossible-in the very paragraph in which this statement appears! See i
The price of fanaticism is eternal vigilance.
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Thus, the concept of homogeneous units of supply of the
same good is fundamental to the law of diminishing marginal
utility-and indeed to all of economics. The adjective "homoge-
neous" is particularly critical. Two objects are units of supply of
the same good, and hence subject to the law of diminishing mar-
ginal utility, only if they are "interchangeable from the point of
view of the actor. ' If the actor does not view the objects as
equally serviceable for the actor's ends, they are simply not units
of supply of the same good, regardless of their physical properties.
This means that only an individual, concrete actor can define
what, for her, constitutes the same good. Two objects with identi-
cal molecular structures, trivially differing only in their location in
space-time, are not necessarily units of supply of the same good.
They are so only if a particular actor chooses to treat them as
such. Thus, if an actor views an elephant and a martini as equally
serviceable for his ends, the elephant and martini are, for that
actor at that instant, units of supply of the same good. Conversely,
if an actor does not view the objects as equally serviceable for her
ends, the objects simply are not units of supply of the same good.
The definition of an economic good is thus radically subjective.
One cannot speak of an economic "good" without asking the
question, "a good to whom?" Without reference to a concrete
actor's actual preferences and values, the concept of an economic
good is literally meaningless.6
The subjective nature of economic goods has important con-
sequences. First, one cannot assume that units of money are nec-
essarily units of supply of the same good for any given actor.
Indeed, there is often good reason to assume the contrary. Sup-
pose that A has one dollar. He perceives that the dollar can be
used to satisfy any one of a specific set of wants, and he uses the
dollar to satisfy the most urgent of those wants. Now suppose that
A has his original dollar and then acquires a second dollar. If A
views that second dollar as being capable of satisfying the same
60. Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 19 ("When a commodity is in such a way available
in specific homogeneous units equally capable of rendering the same service to the actor,
this available stock is called a supply. A supply of a good is available in specific units
each perfectly substitutable for every other.").
61. Many Austrians have pointed out the subjective character of the concept of an
economic good, but they seldom make explicit the obvious conclusion: Nonsubjectivist
talk about goods is literal nonsense. See HAYEK, supra note 56, at 53; ROTHBARD, supra
note 19, at 590-91, 616-17; Wonnell, supra note 20, at 520 n.78.
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set of wants as the first dollar, then the two dollars are, for A,
units of supply of the same good. The law of diminishing marginal
utility thus applies, and the second dollar will be used to satisfy a
less urgent want than the first dollar.
Suppose, however, that A views the second dollar not merely
as capable of satisfying the same set of wants as the first dollar,
but also as expanding the range of wants that A is capable of
satisfying. In other words, he can now either satisfy two sets of
wants rather than one, or choose to satisfy wants that cost between
one and two dollars, which he could not do before. Hence, on
these assumptions, the second dollar is not equally serviceable
with the first. The second dollar can do everything that the first
dollar can do, and more besides. The two dollars are therefore not
units of supply of the same good. It may even be that A values
the second dollar more highly than he values the first dol-
lar-perhaps because he values some of the more-than-one-dollar
wants more highly than any two of the one-dollar-or-less wants.
This circumstance would not violate the law of diminishing mar-
ginal utility, because the two dollars are then not units of supply
of the same good. Similarly, it may well be that A's millionth
dollar is not in fact valued less highly than his 999,999th (or in
theory even his first). The millionth dollar may expand the range
of ends available to A, and thus constitute a different good than
the previous dollars. 2
A second, more dramatic consequence of the subjective na-
ture of economic goods is that interpersonal comparisons of goods
are no more permissible than interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Suppose we want to claim that A and B both view particular
items-such as two apples-as units of supply of the same good.
That means that A and B view the apples as equally serviceable
for their ends. But the judgment of serviceability is an economic
value judgment, which is necessarily subjective for each actor. It is
therefore incoherent to say that A and B view the apples as
"equally" serviceable, as that assumes that one can compare on a
common scale the economic valuations of A and B (and pro-
nounce them equal). A and B might each separately view the
apples as units of supply of a single good, but then all that one
can say is that the apples are units of a good for A and units of a
62. See ROTHBARD, supra note 19, at 64, 268-71.
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good for B. One cannot aggregate the underlying preferences to
say that those goods are really the "same" good for both A and
B. In economics, one cannot add apples and apples across persons
any more than one can add apples and oranges.
I leave it to welfare economists to figure out how much of
welfare economics can survive a subjectivist conception of econom-
ic goods.
II. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL EFFICIENCY
The concept of social efficiency is central to law and econom-
ics in virtually all of its manifestations.63 The normative branch of
law and economics instructs decisionmakers to use social efficiency
as a guide, even if not the sole guide, to conduct. The positive
branch of law and economics will often describe outcomes as
socially efficient or inefficient, without thereby passing judgment
on their desirability. If the concept of social efficiency is incoher-
ent or empty-that is, if efficiency in a social context does not
refer to an intelligible or real phenomenon-all of these descrip-
tive and normative law and economics enterprises become deeply
problematic.
It is easy to see why descriptions that employ incoherent or
empty concepts are rationally inadmissible. If one of the essential
terms of a description is incoherent, the statement no longer func-
tions as a description because it does not make the described
event intelligible to a reasoning mind. Statements like "the result
of policy X will be gleek" or "the result of policy X will be a
greenish shade of cold" have no place in rational discourse. Ac-
cordingly, if "socially efficient" is a term like "gleek" or "greenish
shade of cold," it cannot be used as part of a description. If the
description instead employs a coherent but empty concept of effi-
ciency, it suffers from the equally disabling problem of being nec-
essarily false in all real-world applications. If social efficiency does
not refer to any actual state of affairs, then a statement of the
form "X is socially efficient" simply describes nothing real, and is
thus not much of a description.
Predictive models, however, can and often do employ empty
concepts with great efficacy. Concepts like the square root of
negative oneu are of enormous practical utility, and one can use
63. See COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 68.
64. Perhaps this concept should be deemed incoherent rather than empty. I do not
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them to build internally consistent models that generate valuable
predictions about the physical world. Similarly, economic models
might have enough internal consistency to generate useful predic-
tions even if the concepts they employ have no real-world refer-
ents.65 Accordingly, someone who uses a concept of social effi-
ciency only to generate predictions will be largely uninterested in
the present critique, as long as the model's predictions prove fruit-
ful.' The only caveat is that the events predicted by the model
must be definable independently of the model. That is, there is no
definitive objection to the use of a predictive model that employs
an empty concept of efficiency, but the model's predictions cannot
themselves be couched in terms of empty concepts of efficiency. A
useful prediction of the form "the plaintiff will win" can emerge
from such a model, but a prediction of the form "socially efficient
outcomes will result" cannot, unless one can give a usable account
of social efficiency.
It may seem obvious that a normative model cannot properly
make use of incoherent or empty concepts. To evaluate actions by
reference to an incoherent or nonexistent standard borders on a
definition of psychosis. That is so, however, only if the purpose of
normative theorizing is to yield true normative propositions. If
normative theorizing is more like prediction than description,
empty concepts might have a role to play. Suppose, for instance,
that you have a moral theory consisting of a set of substantive
normative propositions and a method for generating implications
from that propositional set. If an economic model that employs a
concept with no actual referent somehow generates good predic-
tions about the results of application of your moral theory, and if
the model is considerably easier to use in a range of applications
than the theory itself, you might reasonably use the economic
model to predict the result that you would be likely to reach by
pursue the point, because if my arguments are sound with respect to empty concepts,
they are sound a fortiori with respect to incoherent ones.
65. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79
GEO. L.J. 1447, 1476-77 (1991) (noting that 6ne can have a predictive model of legal
decisionmaking based on assumptions that courts and juries try to make interpersonal
utility comparisons even if the actors' beliefs do not make sense).
66. Of course, if a predictive model also specifies a plausible (and thus coherent)
explanation for the predicted events, one will have more confidence in the predictions.
See David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 10, 29-30 (1989). But a predictive model can be fruitful even if one does not know
why it predicts accurately.
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directly applying your moral theory. The model then serves not as
a substantive source of moral truth, but as a proxy for your real
moral theory, which you will have chosen independently of the
economic model. I have long interpreted (perhaps incorrectly)
Judge Posner's moral theory of social wealth maximization in
precisely this fashion. Judge Posner believes that moral knowledge
can ultimately be grounded only in deeply held intuitions.67 A
moral theory of wealth maximization, or of anything else for that
matter, cannot in his view supplant intuitions or ground them in
anything more fundamental, but can help to systematize intuitions
into a form that makes them more readily applicable to concrete
questions. As he put it in 1979, "what is desired in an ethical
theory ... is not a basis for abandoning those fundamental ethical
precepts that all of us accept, if not always obey, but rather a
structure which organizes our intuitions and provides guidance in
dealing with ethical issues where our intuitions are uncertain."'
As I have just described, an economic model can serve these
functions even if it is empty, provided only that it is intelligible
and internally consistent. Any normative law and economics theo-
rist who is prepared to adopt this weak conception of moral rea-
soning can thus safely ignore my critique.
My guess is that most casual users of law and economics have
somewhat grander ambitions for their normative efficiency judg-
ments than I have just set forth. If so, then it is essential that the
meaning(s) of social efficiency they have in mind be ascertained
and closely examined, as every concept of social efficiency that is
used in the modern law and economics literature is either incoher-
ent, useless, or far enough removed from ordinary language to
suggest that equivocation may lurk in the background.
Nonpredictive normative or descriptive arguments that make use
of these concepts offer the same risks. A systematic examination
of each of the most commonly employed concepts of efficiency
will therefore prove fruitful.
67. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 377.
68. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 111 (1979).
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A. Efficiency as Social Welfare Maximization
In its most straightforward sense, efficiency refers to the ratio
of outputs to inputs. To an engineer, a motor is efficient if it
yields the highest achievable ratio of useful energy output to ener-
gy input. To an economist, an individual's actions are economically
efficient if they use available inputs to maximize the present value
of the individual's outputs, keeping in mind that saving an input
for the future is an "output" and that there are many different
ways of valuing outputs.69 So why should we not further say that
a society, social institution, or individual action is economically
efficient if it uses available inputs to maximize the present value
of society's outputs, keeping in mind the same two warnings? In-
deed, law and economics scholars often make precisely such a
move, deeming actions or institutions "efficient" to the extent that
they increase or improve "social welfare." Accordingly, the first
definition of efficiency to consider-a definition that can potential-
ly serve both as a normative guide to conduct and as a way of de-
scribing events-is efficiency as the maximization of social wel-
fare." The related but somewhat different concept of social
wealth maximization is examined later.71
1. The Equivocal Meaning of Welfare. The classic illustra-
tion of the social welfare definition of efficiency is the familiar
economic case for the inefficiency of single-price monopolies.'
The ideal for the welfare economist is the state of perfect compe-
tition, defined as a state "in which the individual buyer or seller
does not influence the price by his purchases or sales."" Sellers
69. Indeed, the efficiency of an actor's conduct need not even be measured by refer-
ence to the value of outputs as perceived by that actor. One could, for example, measure
the efficiency of an actor's conduct by reference to the value of outputs as perceived by
me.
70. Actually, the first definition to consider is efficiency as the maximization of indi-
vidual welfare. This conception of efficiency is both coherent and nonempty, but I am
aware of no law and economics scholar who makes significant descriptive or normative
use of it. Accordingly, I confine my discussion to conceptions of social efficiency.
71. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
72. An eminently readable discussion of this issue is found in RICHARD A. POSNER
& FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATE-
RIALS 4-11 (2d ed. 1981).
73. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87 (3d ed. 1966). The idea of




under perfect competition can sell their entire output at the mar-
ket price, but no output at more than the market price. Hence,
the revenue that sellers can gain from selling an additional, or
marginal, unit is exactly equal to the market price. Sellers thus
have an incentive as profit-maximizers to produce and sell all units
of output whose price exceeds their marginal cost of production
and sale. The marginal cost of an item, the theory continues, rep-
resents society's valuation of the worth of the relevant inputs in
alternative uses, just as the item's price reflects society's valuation
of the output. Thus, when an item's price equals its marginal cost,
resources are being put to their socially optimal uses. Society is
getting as much value out of the relevant inputs as it possibly can,
as evidenced by the fact that no one can profitably bid those
inputs away from their current uses.
Suppose, however, that one of these sellers acquires some
power over its price. Now, if it tries to sell its output for more
than the competitive market price, it will sell some positive quanti-
ty of goods, but fewer than it would sell under competition. This
will be the optimal strategy for many a profit-maximizing seller
who must charge the same price to all prospective purchasers.74
Such a seller will charge a price higher than the competitive price,
and thus higher than marginal cost. This differential between price
and marginal cost is said to constitute a misallocation of social
resources and thus to decrease social welfare. Society at large
would like to see more resources flow into production of the
seller's good, to the point where price, which represents the social
value of the output, and marginal cost, which represents the social
value of the inputs, are equalized. If there are no countervailing
social benefits from monopoly, such as an increase in productive
efficiency (the monopoly might be able to produce the same goods
with fewer inputs) or a reduction in search costs (it is presumably
easier to choose which seller to patronize if there are fewer of
them to choose from), monopoly reduces social welfare and is
therefore inefficient.
Almost all economists who talk about social welfare or social
value in this fashion use it to mean the sum of the welfare of
74. If the seller charges more than the competitive price and consequently sells
fewer than the competitive number of goods, he will lose the revenue from those sales.
But he will gain the revenue that comes from charging a higher price for the goods that
are in fact sold, as well as the costs of producing the larger quantity of goods.
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society's individuals. This summing takes a number of different
forms, the most important of which are critically examined in this
section and subsequent sections. For the moment, however, it is
useful to take literally the definition of efficiency as maximization
of social welfare, without attempting to disaggregate social welfare
into the welfare of society's individual components.
A literal conception of social welfare seems to run headlong
into the problem of methodological individualism. Only concrete
individuals can have goals or ends, because only concrete individu-
als can engage in purposeful action. To the extent that welfare
relates to the satisfaction of human goals or ends, it is a concept
applicable only to individuals, not to collective entities like society,
which can be said only metaphorically to "act."
There are many contexts, however, in which we do speak of
the welfare of entities other than human individuals. We frequent-
ly discuss not only social welfare, but also the welfare of smaller
social units like families or corporations. This kind of talk is co-
herent as long as there is an intelligible standard by which state-
ments about welfare can be evaluated. For example, in the case of
a corporation, we can invent accounting methods that let us define
a conception of corporate welfare-for example, as the maximiza-
tion of the present value of the corporation's net income stream.
An outside observer can then evaluate actions taken by individual
actors on behalf of the corporate entity by reference to their pro-
motion of this objectively discernible end. Indeed, we can refer to
the "welfare" of inanimate objects as readily as we can refer to
the "welfare" of corporations, or other social entities. All that is
necessary is to posit some standard by which "welfare" can be
measured. For example, one can judge the "welfare" of the Rock
of Gibraltar by specifying some measurable physical state (such as
size, mass, or location) as the standard. Action can then either
enhance or reduce the Rock of Gibraltar's "welfare" to the extent
that it promotes or disserves this end.
All such "welfare" measures are coherent, but only because
they bear no relationship to human satisfaction. If "welfare" is
instead being used as a proxy for "utility," and if "utility" means
"experiential satisfaction,"'75 then all of these welfare measures do
in fact founder on the shoals of methodological individualism.
Only acting, conscious individuals can experience satisfaction.
75. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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Thus, when we speak of the welfare of, say, Exxon or the Rock
of Gibraltar, we must guard carefully against equivocation. Princi-
ples that have one meaning in connection with the economic wel-
fare of acting individuals may need to have entirely different
meanings in connection with the "welfare" of corporations or
rocks.
Similarly, there is an infinite number of coherent "welfare"
standards that can be applied to a social entity such as a nation.76
If a nation is small enough so that, in theory, all of its assets,
including its people, could be sold in a market, it may be possible
to apply to it an accounting standard analogous to that employed
for corporations. Even in larger societies, where no such market
for assets is possible,' one can yet make comparative judgments
about social welfare, as we do when we say that the level of wel-
fare in the United States is higher than in Cuba, as long as one
refers to a standard that is interpersonally measurable. This "wel-
fare" measure might refer to some physical quantity, such as the
number of televisions or automobiles per household, the number
of apples consumed per year, the ratio of immigrants to emigrants,
the total weight of all ducks that migrate over the territory, or
some index of such measurable quantities. Alternatively, a judg-
ment that welfare is higher in the United States than in Cuba
could mean something like, "The overwhelming majority of people
in the United States prefer their present condition to what they
think their condition would be if they lived in Cuba." All such
standards are perfectly comprehensible and yield intelligible, and
possibly even useful, notions of social welfare. They do not, how-
ever, appear to be what modern law and economics scholars who
speak of social welfare have in mind."
76. Conventionally, "social welfare" almost always is taken to refer to the welfare of
a particular nation-state. There is obviously nothing inevitable about this convention. The
relevant unit of welfare analysis could be as small as an individual or as large as the
universe.
77. The absence of real markets for such large asset stocks renders highly question-
able such concepts as gross national product or national wealth. It is physically possible
to add up the dollar amount of every recorded monetary transaction in an economy, but
it is not at all obvious what is thereby measured. One is certainly not measuring the
total market value of every good or service that is bought or sold, because there is no
actual market for "every good or service that is bought or sold." The whole does not
necessarily equal the sum of its parts, as any corporate bust-up artist can verify.
78. They were, however, precisely what earlier generations of economists had in
mind. See Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare
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When modem law and economics scholars speak of social
welfare, they seem typically to have in mind an account of welfare
as the satisfaction of individual human preferences. 9 Society is
not literally treated as a distinct, acting entity, but is viewed as the
totality of its individual membership. Social welfare is then identi-
fied as the sum-or, if calculus is employed, the integral-of the
welfare of each individual member of the society, where "welfare"
is understood in terms of preference satisfaction.' When the eco-
nomic case against monopoly described earlier employs the con-
cept of social welfare, it does so in this sense: It claims that the
overall welfare of society, viewed as the sum of the welfare of
each individual actor, is maximized when resources are priced at
their marginal cost.
This aggregative account of social welfare, however, runs
afoul of the interpersonal comparability problem: There is no way
to add, subtract, compare, or contrast the economic welfare, un-
derstood as the satisfaction, of A and B. In the case of monopoly
pricing, for instance, some people, such as the monopolists, gain in
welfare from the move from competition to monopoly, while oth-
ers, such as the consumers of the monopolized product, lose.
There is no way to aggregate those welfare gains and losses; the
subjectivity of utility means that those gains and losses are literally
incommensurable.
The intellectual price of discussing economic welfare as the
satisfaction of human preferences is that the discussion must be
confined to individual actors. One can coherently, and perhaps
even usefully, talk about social welfare, but one cannot do so
using the language of satisfaction. And if one means by "welfare"
something other than human satisfaction, one ought to say so and
Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 512-20 (1984) (describing what they call the
"material welfare school" of economics that predominated in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
At a minimum, any economist who has such a measure in mind should spell it out
with enough precision to enable people to evaluate the usefulness of the model.
79. Those preferences might be actual or ideal. One could aim at maximizing the
satisfaction of (or the results from satisfying) existing preferences or at maximizing the
satisfaction of (or the results from satisfying) the preferences that one believes people
ought to have.
80. See COOTFR & ULEN, supra note 1, at 51 (describing the social welfare function
as "a mathematical function that indicates how the utility of individuals in society are to
be aggregated in order to compute social welfare").
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then explain why that meaning is descriptively important or nor-
matively significant.
2. Is "Social Welfare" Really "Socialist Welfare"? Assume
that we have agreed upon some coherent conception of social
welfare, such as maximizing the average daily caloric intake of the
relevant population. That conception can be used to describe the
effects of various actions, such as a change in tort doctrine, or to
serve as a normative guide.
Any normative use of such a conception, however, effectively
designates a collectivity-the relevant society-as the appropriate
beneficiary of moral conduct. Accordingly, any normative theory
that relies on a social welfare conception of efficiency is morally
collectivist-that is, it holds that people ought to act to enhance
the interests, however defined or measured, of some group of
persons extending beyond, though perhaps including, themselves."1
Of course, one must distinguish this moral collectivism from politi-
cal collectivism, which may or may not flow from it. A moral
collectivist may believe, for example, that the best way to achieve
morally collectivist goals is to leave a great deal of room for indi-
vidual autonomy, such as private management of economic re-
sources, so that her concrete policy recommendations would widely
be regarded as (politically) "individualistic." But regardless of the
81. The possible alternatives to moral collectivism are moral individualism, in which
a single, identifiable person is the appropriate beneficiary of moral conduct, or a theory
in which no person is an appropriate beneficiary of moral conduct. One cannot call this
latter alternative moral nihilism, because one could believe in moral values but hold that
some nonperson, such as God, Nature, or the Rock of Gibraltar, is the appropriate bene-
ficiary of moral conduct. In the absence of an obvious label for this position, I will in-
vent one and call it moral ciphericism.
Two features of this definitional schema bear emphasis. First, moral individualism
can be either egoistic or altruistic. That is, the person who serves as the standard for
evaluating an actor's conduct can be either the actor or someone other than the actor.
Similarly, moral collectivism can be purely altruistic (the actor is not among those who
serve as the relevant objects or units of normative discourse) or partly egoistic and partly
altruistic (the actor counts, but others count as well).
Second, this schema is purely formal: It identifies only the relevant beneficiary of
moral action, not the substantive standard by which actions are evaluated. Consider, for
example, an individualistic ethical theory which declares that Al Franken is the appropri-
ate beneficiary of all moral conduct. This tells us that the morality of actions must be
judged by reference to Al Franken, but it does not tell us to what features of Al
Franken we must look to determine an action's moral status. Theories that instruct us to
maximize (1) Al Franken's satisfaction, (2) Al Franken's weight, or (3) Al Franken's
suffering, are all, from a formal perspective, morally individualistic.
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character of these political recommendations, the entity for whose
interests all resources should be deployed-and thus, in the most
fundamental sense, the moral owner of those resources-is a
group or collective.
A social system in which the collective is viewed as the ulti-
mate owner of all resources is commonly called socialism, All
advocates of a social welfare conception of efficiency as a norma-
tive guide to conduct are thus moral socialists, notwithstanding the
particularistic policy proposals they may advance. They might (or
might not) differ from moral socialists like Karl Marx or Ted
Kennedy in the degree to which they would seek to achieve so-
cialist goals through nominally private stewardship of resources,
but they all agree that the ultimate beneficiary of moral conduct is
the collective rather than the individual.
Of course, to describe a moral theory as socialist, especially
in the distinctively nonpolitical sense *in which that term is used
here, is not to condemn it; socialism might in fact be the correct
moral posture, even for people who reject socialism as a method
of political organization. I mean only to identify it as a too-often-
overlooked presupposition of law and economics moralizing that
employs concepts of social welfare.
B. Efficiency as Pareto Superiority or Pareto Optimality
Few law and economics scholars would quarrel to any great
extent with my methodological criticisms of the social welfare
definition of efficiency. When pressed, most would surely concede
that interpersonal welfare comparisons, where "welfare" is under-
stood to refer to human preference satisfaction, are inadmissible,
and that an aggregative social welfare measure that purports to
sum up the welfare of the various individuals in a society makes
no sense.' Indeed, the thrust of welfare economics since Lionel
82. At least, they would surely concede this in their more careful moments. In less
careful moments, which occur with great frequency in informal law school discussions, the
strictures against interpersonal welfare comparisons are violated as often as they are ob-
served. Even in formal published works, scholars often deny the possibility of interper-
sonal utility comparisons in one breath and affirm it in the next. See, e.g., LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 12, at 18 (1987) (describing how in principle a legislature could
"redistribute wealth until the marginal utility of a dollar is the same to everybody");
POSNER, supra note 1, at 12 (describing a situation in which a poor family would expe-
rience "greater happiness" than a rich one); id. at 14 ("A legally coerced transaction is
less likely to promote happiness than a market transaction, because the misery of the
[Vol. 42:53
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Robbins's classic argument in the 1930s for the impossibility of
scientific interpersonal welfare comparisons 3 has been to formu-
late concepts of efficiency that avoid the obvious problems plagu-
ing the "social welfare" model. The trick is to formulate a defini-
tion of social efficiency that takes seriously both methodological
individualism and economic subjectivism.
1. Pareto Superiority and Pareto Optimality. The prime
candidate for such a definition is Pareto superiority. A change, or
action, is Pareto superior if it makes at least one person better off
by his own standards and no one worse off by her own stan-
dards.' This simple definition complies fully with methodological
individualism: It directs attention only to the actions and welfare
of concrete individuals, one at a time. It avoids altogether the
problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, as each person's
utility is evaluated by her own subjective standards, and no at-
tempt is made to combine or compare utility arithmetically. More-
over, it seems to be a morally attractive model. In a Pareto supe-
rior transaction, somebody gains and nobody loses. Who could
possibly object?
The answer is that no one can object-by definition. If some-
one is disadvantaged by an action, then by virtue of that fact the
action is not Pareto superior. This points up the well-recognized
problem, with Pareto superiority as a descriptive or normative
concept in a social setting: It is perfectly coherent, but it simply
isn't very useful.85 Almost nothing, and perhaps even nothing,
meets the strict criteria of Pareto superiority in the real world if
one is seeking to define "efficiency" for an entire society.
(uncompensated) losers may exceed the joy of the winners."); see also supra note 59. If
satisfaction or happiness is literally incommensurable across persons, these statements are
incoherent.
83. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECO-
NOMIC SCIENCE 139-41 (2d ed. 1935), On Lord Robbins's pivotal role in the history of
economic thought, see NICHOLAS MIERCURO & TIMOTHY P. RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 70 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1034-36.
84. The standard is named for Vilfredo Pareto, who is typically given credit for
devising it. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1215 n.14. For more elaborate discussions of
Pareto superiority (and Pareto optimality), see COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 71-76;
POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
85. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 12; Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1216-17;
Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 9.
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Consider the simplest possible model of voluntary, mutually
beneficial exchange: A trades B an apple for a banana. A and B
are both happy with the transaction. If the relevant universe con-
sists only of A and B, that is the end of the matter: The exchange
is Pareto superior. But in all real-world universes in which legal
rules operate, there are numerous Cs and Ds out there as well.
There are many reasons why one or more of these Cs might deem
himself worse off as a result of the transaction. For example, C
might be a curmudgeon who is distressed by the prospect of peo-
ple experiencing satisfaction,86 an egalitarian who, rightly or
wrongly, regards the transaction as exacerbating wealth differences
among people," or a die-hard Marxist who finds the very idea of
voluntary exchange intolerable. C might also doubt whether A or
B deserve to gain satisfaction, either because he thinks that they
are unworthy people or because he believes that D, rather than A
or B, is the rightful owner of the apple or banana.' Finally, even
if no one in the world but A and B ever learns of the transaction,
it is inconceivable that its ripple effects will have no actual ad-
verse consequences for third parties. If A and B do not transact,
they will each take some other course of action. That different
course will alter the behavior of other people, and so on. Can it
really be the case that no person in the relevant universe would
be better off, by their own lights, by virtue of this alternative
course of events?89 Moreover, if we are seeking to analyze the
rules that legal decisionmakers do or ought to promulgate and
follow, as seems to be the case with all law and economics schol-
arship of which I am aware,' it is hard to imagine that those
86. Cf. Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 913, 917-18 (1980) (raising the possibility of envy as an obstacle to Pareto superior-
ity).
87. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1217; Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 583 (1980).
88. See COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 93, 128-29. Coleman suggests that moral con-
siderations of this kind should lead us to deny that Pareto superior transactions neces-
sarily warrant our moral approval. It seems to me that they instead call into question
whether the transactions are in fact Pareto superior. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at
1217.
89. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that "most transactions ... have effects
on third parties, if no more than by changing the prices of other goods").
90. Posner is explicit on this point. See Posner, supra note 12, at 103 ("It must also
be emphasized that it is a political philosophy that I am expounding."); cf. John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 224-25, 245
(1985) (cautioning against using his prescribed methods of moral reasoning to derive
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rules could entirely escape the notice of every curmudgeon, egali-
tarian, and Marxist who would find some ground on which to ob-
ject to voluntary transactions. And, in fine individualist fashion, it
takes only one curmudgeon, egalitarian, or Marxist to prevent an
action from being Pareto superior. Thus Pareto superiority is
methodologically coherent, but normatively and descriptively emp-
ty.
These problems carry over to the related concept of Pareto
optimality. Pareto superiority describes changes or actions; Pareto
optimality describes states of affairs. A state of affairs is Pareto
optimal, and hence efficient, if no Pareto superior moves can be
made from it-that is, if any changes from that state of affairs
must make at least one person worse off by his own standards.
Again, this is a coherent definition of efficiency: It views each
individual as an individual, and there is no attempt to make inter-
personal comparisons of welfare. But again, the definition is emp-
ty. If Pareto superior moves are a virtual impossibility (or a flat-
out impossibility in the case of changes in legal rules), then any
given state of affairs will be Pareto optimal. Efficiency then does
not distinguish one state of affairs from another, and hence serves
no cognitive purpose: Whatever is, is efficient.91
principles of individual conduct rather than specifically political principles).
91. For a somewhat different demonstration of the emptiness (or, perhaps one
should say, the fullness) of Pareto optimality, see Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1215-17.
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2. Is Paretianism a Communist Plot? It is easy to see that
the normative social welfare conception of efficiency involves
collectivist, or socialist, moral presuppositions-as Judge Posner
has recently acknowledged.' It is slightly more difficult to see
that Paretian definitions of efficiency have the same property. An
action is Pareto superior, and hence efficient, only when the action
makes no person in the relevant community worse off by that
person's own standards. If Pareto superiority is adopted as a nor-
mative criterion, then the goodness of an action must be evaluated
by reference to its effects on numerous persons other than the
actor, including curmudgeons, egalitarians, and Marxists. Because
of this, Paretianism is at root just as socialistic a notion as the
social welfare definition of efficiency. Pareto superiority and
Pareto optimality respect the principles of methodological individu-
alism, in that they treat society as a collection of discrete persons
rather than as an entity in itself. But they do not respect the
principles of normative individualism, in that they consider the
appropriate beneficiary of moral action to be a group of individu-
als.
Again, to describe the various Paretian standards as socialist
or collectivist, in the specialized sense in which those terms are
employed here, is not to criticize them; socialism may in fact be
the appropriate normative posture. But that is surely a position
that is not self-evident.
C. Efficiency as Potential Pareto Superiority
Economists have long been aware of the limited utility of
Paretian standards of social efficiency. This strongly suggests that
Paretianism is not what most economists have in mind when they
talk about social efficiency. If efficiency means Pareto superiority,
economists in the real world will have literally no occasion to use
it; and if it means Pareto optimality, economists will have literally
every occasion to use it, and it will therefore tell us nothing of
interest. But in fact economists frequently talk about efficiency as
though they were describing or prescribing something of conse-
quence. If they don't mean efficiency as social welfare, because of
that definition's oft-acknowledged methodological problems, and if
92. POSNER, supra note 13, at 376-80.
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they don't mean efficiency as Paretianism, because of that
definition's oft-acknowledged uselessness, then what do they
mean?
The likely answer is provided by Judge Posner:
Because the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost
never satisfied in the real world, yet economists talk quite a bit
about efficiency, it is pretty clear that the operating definition of
efficiency in economics is not Pareto superiority. When an econo-
mist says that free trade or competition or the control of pollu-
tion or some other policy or state of the world is efficient, nine
times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient ....
A formal definition of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is offered by Jules
Coleman:
One state of affairs (E') is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another (E)
if and only if those whose welfare increases in the move from E
to E' could fully compensate those whose welfare diminishes with
a net gain in welfare. Under Kaldor-Hicks, compensation to
losers is not in fact paid. Were the payment transaction costless
and full compensation given to the losers, Kaldor-Hicks distribu-
tions would be transformed into Pareto-superior ones. This char-
acteristic of Kaldor-Hicks has led some to refer to it as a "poten-
tial Pareto-superior" standard.94
The meaning of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can best be grasped
by understanding its origin. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency emerged from
the efforts of economists, most notably Nicholas Kaldor' and
John Hicks,96 to explain how Lionel Robbins could be right about
93. POSNER, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added); see also POSNER, ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 91-92 (noting that "when economists say that monopoly is
inefficient, they mean inefficient in the Kaldor-Hicks or wealth-maximization, not the
Pareto, sense").
94. COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 98; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 13 ("The
Kaldor-Hicks concept is also and suggestively called potential Pareto superiority: The
winners could compensate the losers, but need not (not always, anyway)."); Calabresi,
supra note 10, at 1221-22 (stating that the Kaldor-Hicks test is "sometimes called poten-
tial Pareto superiority"); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-
personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550-51 (1939) (noting that an econo-
mist may justify a policy by simply showing that it is possible for winners to compensate
losers and still have a net gain).
95. See Kaldor, supra note 94, at 549.
96. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
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the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons' and yet
economists could still have useful things to say about public policy.
How could economists claim that certain actions, such as the re-
peal of the Corn. Laws, were efficient when they resulted in gains
in utility or welfare for some people but losses for others? In
many circumstances, the number of people who gain from an
action is much larger than the number who lose, but without the
ability to make interpersonal comparisons, it seemed that econo-
mists would have no way to deem the gains to the winners "larg-
er" than the losses to the losers.
The task was thus to avoid any such interpersonal compari-
sons without running afoul of the unrealizable unanimity require-
ments of Pareto superiority. The solution was to claim that in
many circumstances those who gained from an action would be
able in principle to pay off those who lost, such that the "losers"
would no longer regard themselves as losers, and there would still
be something left over for themselves, the "winners." Thus, one
would not need to say that the winners gained "more" than the
losers lost (though some economists would in fact say this, in-
cluding those who should know better).98 One would only have to
say that the losers could be fully compensated and the winners
would have something left over, without implying any aggregative,
interpersonal utility judgments. Hence, as Professor Coleman ob-
serves, the standard is often called potential Pareto superiority.99
If the losers are in fact compensated for their loss, then by defi-
nition there are no losers and the Pareto standard is satisfied.
Thus, as long as such compensation is possible, an action is poten-
tially Pareto superior. The catch is that under Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficiency, one can call the action efficient whether or not the losers
are in fact compensated. Hence, even if there are losers in fact,
and the strict Paretian criterion of unanimity is therefore not satis-
fied, economists can nonetheless make judgments of efficiency
without violating either methodological individualism or the con-
straint against interpersonal utility comparisons.
It is tempting to criticize Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for falling
prey to the same fallacies that undermine utility-based versions of
the social welfare conception of efficiency." Kaldor-Hicks effi-
97. See supra text accompanying note 83.
98. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 16.
99. See COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 98.
100. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and
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ciency seems to "require[] the economist to proceed as if a dollar
were equally valuable to everyone,... which obviously violates
the strictures against interpersonal comparisons."° But this criti-
cism is off the mark. In its pristine form, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
does not have to make any interpersonal welfare assumptions. It
need only assume that all of the self-defined real-world losers from
an action could, by their own standards, be turned into non-losers
by appropriate compensation from the winners, while still leaving
the winners with something. 3 In the absence of actual compensa-
tion, one of course cannot make any judgments about welfare as
preference satisfaction (beyond the obvious fact that some people's
welfare is enhanced while others' is reduced);1" but the whole
point of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is to provide an alternative to the
preference-based social welfare conception of efficiency. The con-
cept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, whatever other defects it may
have, is coherent.
It is, however, as useless as Pareto superiority. Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency purchases its coherence by requiring that compensation
be hypothetically possible in such a way as to guarantee that each
person, by her own standards, does not come away a loser, just as
strict Paretianism requires that each person judge herself to be as
well off or better off than before. All it takes to make the uni-
verse of Kaldor-Hicks-efficient transactions an empty set is one
person who sincerely cannot be bought-that is, a person who
values autonomy, either his own or that of others, so highly that
no amount of after-the-fact compensation could possibly leave him
as well off as he would have been had the loss never been inflict-
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 625 (1990) (stating that Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency "requires comparing one party's losses with another's gains").
101. Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 78, at 526; see also POSNER & EASTERBROOK,
supra note 72, at 9-10 (contrasting the "wealth" concept of welfare, in which a dollar is
assumed to be of the same value to all consumers, and the "utility" concept, in which
that assumption is dropped); Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 849 (discussing the Kaldor-
Hicks assumptions that individuals derive the same utility from a dollar of income and
that the marginal utility of income is constant).
102. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1223; Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 833-34;
Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1041.
103. See Kaldor, supra note 94, at 551 n.1.
104. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1223.
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ed (without consent) in the first place. In a large population,
no legal rule will ever satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion.
The morally collectivist character of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
as a normative criterion does not warrant extended discussion. It is
obvious that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is morally collectivist, for the
same reasons that Paretianism is morally collectivist."'
D. Efficiency as Social Wealth Maximization
If Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is indeed as useless as Pareto supe-
riority, perhaps economists who talk about efficiency are not really
using the term in its pristine Kaldor-Hicks sense. And in fact,
economists typically add some assumptions to the Kaldor-Hicks
framework to give it more real-world application.
The objects of inquiry for the Paretian or Kaldor-Hicks econ-
omist are the values that people actually hold, for good or ill.
Utility is understood to flow from achievement of those values.
This focus on preference satisfaction meets the twin demands of
methodological individualism and economic subjectivism, but it also
renders efficiency useless as a descriptive tool or normative guide.
The search for a more robust conception of efficiency leads
many economists to look at ends other than preference satisfac-
tion, such as the production of wealth. This yields yet another oft-
employed' definition of efficiency: An action is efficient to the
extent that it maximizes social wealth. The operative principle of
wealth maximization is clearly described by its leading proponent:
The "wealth" in "wealth maximization" refers to the sum of all
tangible and intangible goods and services, weighted by prices of
two sorts: offer prices (what people are willing to pay for goods
they do not already own); and asking prices (what people de-
mand to sell what they do own). If A would be willing to pay up
to $100 for B's stamp collection, it is worth $100 to A. If B
would be willing to sell the stamp collection for any price above
$90, it is worth $90 to B. So if B sells the stamp collection to
A .... the wealth of society will rise by $10. Before the trans-
action A had $100 in cash and B had a stamp collection worth
105. See COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 138 (suggesting that persons who place an infi-
nite value on autonomy can defeat the legitimacy of forced exchanges under Kaldor-
Hicks principles); Rothbard, supra note 25, at 98. Kaldor was aware of this point, though
he obviously did not appreciate its significance. See Kaldor, supra note 94, at 551 n.1.
106. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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$90 (a total of $190); after the transaction A has a stamp collec-
tion worth $100 and B has $100 in cash (a total of $200). The
transaction will not raise measured wealth-gross national
product, national income, or whatever-by $10; it will not raise it
at all unless the transaction is recorded, and if it is recorded it is
likely to raise measured wealth by the full $100 purchase price.
But the real addition to social wealth consists of the $10 incre-
ment in nonpecuniary satisfaction that A derives from the pur-
chase, compared with that of B.1"
In other words, one considers only those preferences that are
backed by a willingness and ability to pay money in a market.
One can then (at least in principle) sum up the present value of
all of the dollar equivalents of . those preferences in a relevant
society at any given instant to yield a social wealth figure,1" and
one can describe* or evaluate actions by reference to their effects
on this figure.
Social wealth maximization, as thus defined, is a coherent
concept. It complies fully with methodological individualism; social
wealth means merely the sum of the wealth of all individual mem-
bers of society. Furthermore, it does not require any interpersonal
utility comparisons. Indeed, it does not require any references to
utility at all. Wealth maximization measures wealth, not utility, and
no one can deny that wealth, as the theory defines it, is interper-
sonally aggregable.1" Finally, social wealth maximization is a ro-
bust concept. There may be insurmountable informational obstacles
to determining the actual full social wealth effects of any particular
action, but there are surely ranges of cases in which one can make
reasonably good guesses about effects on social wealth as the
theory defines it."' Hence, by abandoning reliance on utility or
welfare measures, social wealth maximization avoids the method-
107. POSNER, supra note 13, at 356. David Friedman attributes the early development
of this conception of efficiency to Alfred Marshall. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at
351-54. For useful clarifications of the concept of wealth, see D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth
Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (1986).
108. The present value aspect of the definition of wealth is critical to the wealth
maximization concept, for reasons that are happily incidental to my argument. For an im-
portant and elegant discussion, see Johnsen, supra note 107, at 270-74.
109. One must, of course, keep in mind that such aggregations cannot be viewed as
representing the value of the total stock of goods and services in the society. See supra
note 77. But this goes to the usefulness of the concept of wealth maximization rather
than to its coherence.
110. See Johnsen, supra note 107, at 284-87.
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ological problems of interpersonal comparisons while maintaining a
real-world domain of application that Paretianism and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency cannot claim. But like the various social welfare
definitions that similarly attain coherence,"' social wealth maximi-
zation thereby ceases to be a concept of efficiency in any mean-
ingful economic sense.
This last point is partly semantic, but only partly. To under-
stand what I am getting at, consider a theory of efficiency as social
weight maximization, where the object is to maximize the sum of
the weights of all individual members of society. (Whether one is
trying to maximize average weight or total weight is not impor-
tant.) An action is efficient under this theory to the extent that it
increases social weight more than do alternative courses of action.
This is a coherent theory of efficiency. It violates neither method-
ological individualism nor the strictures against interpersonal utility
comparisons. It simply requires maximization of an .objectively
determinable quantity. As with measuring social wealth, attempts
to trace through an action's weight effects on all members of soci-
ety face insuperable informational problems, but there will surely
be a range of cases in which reasonable guesses can be made.
No one, of course, uses weight maximization as a standard of
efficiency. But why not? One good and complete answer would be
that wealth maximization can help generate good predictions,
whereas weight maximization cannot (or at least has not been
shown to be a useful part of a fruitful predictive model). But
scholars who are interested in description or prescription need
another answer-and they need to be careful about it.
A natural suspicion is that wealth maximization has proven
attractive because it seems like a reasonable proxy for welfare-as-
preference-satisfaction. We cannot directly measure satisfaction,
one might argue, but it is plausible to think that wealth is some-
what connected, even if imperfectly, to satisfaction. Maximizing
wealth may not maximize welfare or satisfaction, the argument
might continue, but it is as close as we can come.
Such reasoning is seductive-and it is dangerously wrong. The
moment that one tries to relate wealth to welfare or preference
satisfaction in any way that involves interpersonal aggregations or
comparisons, wealth maximization disintegrates into incoher-
111. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
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ence.n2 Interpersonal utility comparisons are category mistakes.
They cannot be made directly, they cannot be modelled, and they
cannot be represented by proxies. A proxy for a category mistake
is simply another category mistake. Persons who employ a wealth
maximization conception of efficiency thus need to guard vigilantly
against the fallacy of equivocation, in which they shift from effi-
ciency-as-wealth-maximization to efficiency-as-wealth-maximization-
as-proxy-for-preference-satisfaction. Wealth is one thing (which
happens to be interpersonally comparable), satisfaction is another
(which happens not to be interpersonally comparable), and never
the twain shall meet.
None of this, of course, requires abandonment of, or even
significant revisions in, the enterprise of law and economics. It
may well be that a measure of social wealth that bears no coher-
ent relationship to human satisfaction can serve many useful func-
tions, just as a measure of social weight might be useful. It may,
for example, help one accurately predict the outcomes of common
law adjudications. It may help one systematize and apply a norma-
tive theory. One might even be able to argue that social wealth
(or social weight) ought to be the appropriate standard of value
for human conduct. But those who use the concept of social
wealth should be aware that they cannot be saying anything, or at
least anything useful, about human satisfaction.'
112. See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1045 & n.257. Professor Hovenkamp has
nicely demonstrated the unbridgeable gap between social wealth maximization and social
welfare maximization. See Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 826-47. But his discussion rests
on the assumption that wealth maximization is designed to be a surrogate welfare mea-
sure. See id. at 816, 825, 835. It is in fact an alternative to welfare measures, which
means that its principal fault is not incoherence or undisclosed normativity, but simply
susceptibility to equivocation-as Professor Hovenkamp elsewhere recognizes. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 68-69. Of course, if someone does try to use wealth maxi-
mization as a proxy for welfare maximization, Professor Hovenkamp's critique is unan-
swerable.
113. This is a bit of an overstatement in two respects. First, behind every increment
of social wealth lies a preference, so it is false to say that wealth is wholly unrelated to
preferences and hence to their satisfaction. But it is unrelated in any way that permits
interpersonal comparisons. Second, wealth might have a very close relationship to human
welfare in some noneconomic sense that does not depend on preference satisfaction. That
is, one might have some coherent conception of social welfare (such as maximizing aver-
age daily caloric intake) that one believes will be well served by maximizing social
wealth as a proxy. In that case, however, one needs to spell out the coherent conception
of social welfare for which wealth maximization is a stand-in.
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I have no doubt that Judge Posner and others of his stature
are aware of these problems. n4 I have grave doubts, however,
that most persons who purport to be applying law and economics,
whether in print or in casual conversation, have the same level of
awareness. If they believe that by discussing efficiency they are
saying something about human satisfaction, either directly or by
proxy, they are mistaken. If they correctly understand the meaning
of efficiency and still want to talk about it, that is their business,
just as it is their business if they want to talk about social weight
maximization. They need only tell us what they are doing, and
perhaps why.
Needless to say, social wealth maximization as a normative
ideal is every bit as morally collectivist as the various social wel-
fare conceptions of efficiency discussed earlier."'
E. Efficiency as Social Coordination
A number of economists in the Austrian tradition1.6 have
proposed a definition of economic efficiency as the maximization
of plan coordination. 7 The definition stems from the fact that
individuals do not simply maximize preference satisfaction at given
points in time in light of given resources-they also plan for the
future; and indeed they do the latter more than the former. Those
plans must involve the anticipated use of resources, as one cannot
achieve ends without the use of means. In a social setting, where
many people might have conflicting plans for the same resources,
one's ability to formulate and then execute sensible plans depends
on the extent to which those plans can successfully be coordinated
with the inconsistent plans of others. The primary economic prob-
lem facing a society, in other words, is not the maximization of
satisfaction in light of known preferences and resources but rather
the coordination of individual plans in the face of uncertainty
114. In any event, if I have correctly understood Judge Posner's approach to moral
theory, most if not all of his project survives this critique intact. See supra text accom-
panying notes 67-68.
115. See supra text accompanying note 81.
116. See supra note 55.
117. See DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A
POLICY FAILURE 29-30 (1982); Roy E. Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the
Economics of Harmful Effects, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 229, 237-39 (1989); Israel M.
Kirzner, Philosophical and Ethical Implications of Austrian Economics, in FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 25, at 75, 85.
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about the future. Individuals can only formulate and pursue their
plans efficiently if they have tolerably accurate information about
the way in which those plans will mesh, or fail to mesh, with the
plans of others. Hence, the most plausible account of social effi-
ciency, some Austrians argue, is as a (rough, qualitative) measure
of the extent to which institutions foster or inhibit individual plan
coordination. As one Austrian puts it, "[t]he task that is faced by
economic analysts in attempting to maximize economic efficiency
for society is to identify legal institutions that minimize conflicts in
the use of resources and allow the economic system to maximize
the dissemination and use of knowledge." '118
The problem is that this is not really an alternative definition
of efficiency, but is instead simply a different variant of either
Pareto superiority or social welfare maximization. In order to
judge an action or institution efficient, must it improve plan coor-
dination for each and every person in the relevant community? If
so, then plan-coordination efficiency is a form of Pareto efficiency,
with plan coordination substituting for preference satisfaction as
the point on which agreement must be secured. As such, it is
subject to the same problem faced by Paretianism: One sociopath
is enough to destroy the efficiency of every action or institution. If
an action can be efficient without improving coordination for ev-
eryone, then there must be some way to compare and maximize
plan coordination across persons. That appears to be identical in
form to social welfare maximization conceptions of efficiency, with
plan coordination again substituting for preference satisfaction. The
Austrian alternative thus does not provide a conception of social
efficiency that is simultaneously coherent, robust, and economic.
III. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH
The suspicion arises that a conception of social efficiency that
is simultaneously coherent, robust, and economic is simply not to
be found. To the best of my knowledge, no one has provided one,
and the arguments in this Article at least suggest that no one ever
will. It makes sense to talk about efficiency in 'the context of a
given individual's plans and preferences, but the term does not
translate well when one tries to apply it to groups of individuals.
118. Cordato, supra note 117, at 239.
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Perhaps the time has come for economists and law and economics
scholars simply to stop talking about social efficiency altogether.
That does not mean, of course, that they should stop talking
about law and economics. As I have repeatedly emphasized, to the
extent that law and economics is fundamentally about prediction, it
must worry only about the usefulness of its predictive conclusions,
not the model that generates them. Similarly, there is an important
role for law and economics in identifying the consequences of
various actions and legal rules. Finally, nothing in this Article
suggests that people should abandon the search for a normative
ideal couched in economi6 terms. All I ask is that if people use
the concept of social efficiency, they be clear about its meaning
and apply that meaning consistently. If one constructs an argument
of the form "all efficient rules are X; A is an efficient rule; there-
fore, A is X," one must be sure that the term "efficient" has the
same, coherent meaning in the major and minor premises. Clarifi-
cation of this kind does not end all inquiry into such arguments,
but it is a necessary first step to understanding them.
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